Key drivers behind Russia’s ability to fight despite sanctions

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This was the subject covered in a recent report by the DC-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) called Out of Stock? Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry.

The report offers a detailed analysis of Russia’s equipment losses and the impact of Western sanctions on its military-industrial complex. It states that these factors have forced Moscow to pivot to a slower campaign in an attempt to deplete Ukraine's military potential.

“Russia has lost a significant amount of military equipment, which may limit its ability to conduct large-scale ground offensives,” the report reads.

“This may be one of the reasons why the Russian authorities and (Russian dictator) Vladimir Putin in particular present this war as a long-term undertaking (supposedly) necessary to ensure the security of Russia itself.”

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The authors add that Moscow’s key strategy in Ukraine now seems to be to impose a protracted struggle that will slowly deplete Ukraine's weapons stockpiles and the West’s will to help Kyiv.

NV has compiled the most salient findings from the CSIS report.

1. Russia has lost 10,000-22,500 pieces of equipment during its full-scale invasion

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Although the Russian Ministry of Defense has classified all information about military equipment losses in the war against Ukraine, CSIS points to several estimates that give an idea of ​​the scale of these losses of the Russian army.

● Minimum estimate: 9,700 units of equipment, based upon data from the Dutch OSINT project Oryx, which establishes numbers of destroyed, damaged, abandoned, and captured Russian military vehicles systems which can be confirmed with visual evidence (CSIS analysts point out that this estimate likely represents the lower bound of Russian equipment losses, as on the battlefield, there are inevitably losses for which there is no publicly-available visual evidence).

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● Maximum estimate: 22,500 units of equipment, based upon information from the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of Ukraine as of publication time (analysts consider this to be the upper bound of losses, based on the one hand on the fact that the UAF has significantly greater access to genuine Russian data on losses than is publicly available, while on the other hand that they “have the motive” to inflate reports of their battlefield successes).

These figures represent overall losses of various weapons and equipment systems, including military trucks, tanks and other heavy equipment, artillery systems, drones, MLRS, aircraft, ships, etc.

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2. Russia loses about 150 tanks every month, and its industry cannot compensate for this

The Russian Army’s need for modern main battle tanks (MBTs) exceeds the country’s current production rates, according to the report. The authors estimates that Russian tank factory Uralvagonzavod can only produce 20 tanks per month, while according to Oryx’s conservative estimates, Russia is losing at least 148 tanks per month. Recently, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, boasted that the Russian military-industrial complex would allegedly produce 1,500 modern MBTs in 2023, but independent Russian military experts consider this goal to be "completely impossible." At the same time, some of them note that Moscow is able to modernize its Soviet-era tanks, equipping them with new communication systems, electronics, and other components.

3. Despite heavy losses of modern tanks, reserves of old vehicles remain a threat

According to the report’s estimates, Moscow has lost between 1,845 and 3,511 tanks during the first year of its full-scale war, but it is believed to still have about 5,000 old tanks in cold storage.

CSIS analysts note that Moscow has suffered especially heavy losses of its modern T-72B3 tanks (a model that was put into service in 2013 as an upgraded version of the T-72B tank).

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“This has ultimately forced Russia to bring older tanks, manufactured several years and sometimes decades prior to the start of Russia’s military modernization program in 2011, into service as replacements,” they explain.

They also note that the rarity of more advanced Russian equipment on the front (such as the “third generation” T-90A and T-90M tanks, or the upgraded T-80BVM) may indicate that Russia has so far deliberately kept them from being used on the battlefield.

The experts also cite earlier data on how many relatively modern tanks Russia had before the full-scale invasion (specifically, in 2020, they had about 700 T-90 and T-80 tanks and up to 2,000 different versions of the T-72s).

While Russia has lost a significant proportion of its pre-war tank fleet – up to 40% by some estimates – it likely retains a significant portion of its post-2011 retrofit tank stock, as well as a large number of older Cold War-era tanks. Moscow also has the industrial capacity to repair and upgrade this equipment, CSIS warns.

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According to some reports, the Russian military-industrial complex is able to restore and upgrade about 90 old MBTs per month, despite Western sanctions.

“Therefore, the Kremlin will likely be able to maintain the supply of tanks to its forces in Ukraine for some time,” the report’s authors predict.

“However, in the longer term, the allied export restrictions on certain key Western spare parts used in modern tank production… may significantly degrade Moscow’s defense industrial capacity to manufacture advanced MBTs.”

4. Sanctions at work: five component shortages taking toll on the Russian army

U.S. intelligence has calculated that since February 2022, sanctions and export restrictions have resulted in Russia being unable to replace more than 6,000 pieces of lost military equipment, forcing production to halt at some key defense industrial facilities and causing shortages of critical components for tanks, aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), electronic warfare assets, and other items.

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The authors of the report identify five technological components shortages of which are debilitating for the Russian military-industrial complex. These are generally dual-use components:

Optical systems: these are critical to the production of modern tanks in Russia. Before the war, the Russian military imported a critical mass of advanced optical systems from France, which has now blocked those supplies. In particular, the authors of the report point out that Russia is now equipping some of its tanks (T-80BVM and T-72B3M) with less sophisticated and effective sights than should be used in these vehicles. “Russia’s tank fleet will likely become even less sophisticated as the war continues,” the report states.

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Bearings: these are necessary for the production of any type of vehicles, including military equipment. Russia previously imported most of its high-quality bearings from Western countries, with up to 55% coming from Europe and North America. Now, according to the U.S. government, Russia is already facing shortages which affect the production of all types of vehicles, from tanks to aircraft, and even submarines. The shortage is exacerbated by the civilian industry's need for bearings, as Russia's railroad-dependent economy is suffering direct losses as trains become more difficult to produce and repair. The authors of the report believe that the Russian Federation may increase the import of bearings from China or Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia, but their quality will be much lower, which may also affect the reliability of equipment.

Machine tools: industrial machine tools are crucial in the production of many types of weapons and military equipment, including aircraft. Even before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian machine tool industry had long been in crisis. According to rough estimates, the Russian industry was 70–80% dependent on imported machine tool products, while the defense sector accounted for 85% of all Russian demand for precision machine tools. China – world's largest producer of these goods – also remains dependent on Western imports to create the most technologically advanced machine tools that the Russian defense market lacks. Thus, Russia is facing an acute shortage of sophisticated tools in most advanced categories, the report’s authors explain.

Engines, especially for aircraft: The report’s authors point out that Russia's problems with the production of high-quality engines were noticeable even before the war in Ukraine. Thus, new Russian Su-57 fighters are likely to still rely on older fourth-generation engines (including the Saturn AL41-F1 engines that were used in Su-35S). Even before 2014, Russia’s aviation industry relied heavily on the engines of the Ukrainian company Motor Sich. In addition to its military, Russia’s civil Russian aviation industry is suffering from a shortage of turbofan engines. Moreover, Chinese engine maker Weichai has stopped supplying engines for Russian tractors because their manufacturer KamAZ was sanctioned by the West as a supplier of vehicles for the Russian military.

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Microchips: these are necessary in the production of a wide variety of weapons systems, as well as communications and electronic warfare systems. However, domestic chip production in Russia has lagged behind Western industrial standards for many years, which markedly increases its dependence on Western-made microchips whose supply is currently limited. For example, according to the UK Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Orlan-10 reconnaissance UAVs contain U.S.-made microcircuits manufactured by Texas Instruments and Honeywell. Western-made chips have also been found in Russian Lancet UAVs, Azart radio stations, and other military equipment. In addition, a study by Conflict Armament Research has shown that satellite navigation units in several Russian missiles, such as the 3M14, 9M544, Kh-59, and Kh-101 contain several foreign-made microchips. At the same time, the volume of production of microprocessors in Russia itself is small, and what they manufacture is inferior in quality to Western products. Russia will not be able to solve this problem quickly. Should it decide to import microchips from China, it could in some cases require a complete redesign of electronic equipment and restructuring of production chains, which can take years to complete. In addition, Chinese microchips are also often inferior to leading Western designs. Today, Russia needs 30,000 base-level microchip boards per month, while their domestic production tops out at only 8,000 per month.

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Of course, Russia is working to circumvent the sanctions, as the authors explain in a separate section devoted to the issue, drawing attention to the Kremlin’s remarkable capacity to adapt to trade restrictions. They note that in 2022, Russia imported numerous high-tech components which it had been banned from acquiring directly – by sourcing them from third countries in Asia, Africa, and even Europe through a variety of shell companies using fake end-user certificates and other methods.

On the other hand, this pressure on the Russian military-industrial complex, which has forced Moscow to turn to less reliable suppliers, more expensive supply routes, and lower-quality imports, is likely to "slow down the speed and quality of Russian defense production," the report argues. It also states that Moscow's efforts to carry out import substitution through state support so far remain “mostly unsuccessful.”

“This ultimately impacts Russia’s ability to manufacture, sustain, and deliver advanced weapons and technology to the battlefield in Ukraine,” the authors write.

“Therefore, while the quality of the military equipment used by the Ukrainian army continues to improve thanks to the Western aid, the quality of Russia’s weapons continues to degrade.”

5. War of attrition: how Ukrainian forces can compensate for Russia’s quantitative advantages

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Despite its equipment losses, Russia's military potential still far exceeds that of Ukraine in many respects, the report points out. The quantitative advantage in military equipment means that Western countries are facing the risk of a war of attrition, which the Russia now prefers, hoping it can wait until Ukraine depletes its arms reserves.

The report lays out some rough estimates as of February 2023:

● The overall quantity of aircraft at Moscow’s disposal was 13-15 times more than what Kyiv has;

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● Russia has almost 7−8 times more tanks and around 4 times more armored fighting vehicles than Ukraine;

● The Russian navy is 12-16 larger than Ukraine’s.

These quantitative advantages could allow Moscow to wage a grueling war this year, in spite of sanctions, the report says. Therefore, it is critical that Ukraine can compensate for Russia’s quantitative advantages by fighting with the best Western-made weapons, the authors conclude. They note that “the pace and quality of Russian military operations will in fact depend on the Ukrainian military’s ability to field systems capable of countering Russian tactics,” in particular with the help of Western arms. As they explain, the Russian army is still able to put modernized T-62 tanks (first introduced in the early 1960s) on the front lines, even if these vehicles do not have sophisticated optics or modern weapons. However, the effectiveness of such systems “will be significantly offset by Ukraine's further access to more advanced Western technologies,” such as Javelins or NLAWs, or precision artillery.

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“This is the crux of this war in its second year: the Russian military can rely on its mass and continue feeding older or less than state-of-the-art technology as long as it thinks it can simply outlast the Western deliveries of weapons and systems to Ukraine,” the report concludes.

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Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine